LIMA – No Vendor, No Cloud, No Trust: Open Source Tamper Attestation for Critical Infrastructure Hardware

Justin T. Knox

LIMA is an open-source attestation system that lets a field device cryptographically prove its sensor readings are authentic and untampered with – over a SCADA network or any network at all. The talk walks the full stack: a Zephyr RTOS firmware node on the nRF52840 signs sensor and accelerometer data with ECDSA-P256 using the chip’s onboard CryptoCell-310 hardware security engine, broadcasts 90-byte attested payloads over BLE extended advertising, and delivers them to a blind-relay Rust gateway that verifies every signature without ever holding a private key. A live demo – with a recorded fallback – shows a physical tamper event (a shock to a field device) propagating through the cryptographic chain to a verified alert in about a second. Justin will then cover why the project exists and who it is for (individuals and small operators through to enterprise deployments), and give a walkthrough on how to stand up an example node.

Sunday 1500 Gramercy Park Suite


Justin T. Knox is a senior ICS/OT security engineer with 20 years of operational experience across electric and water utilities, datacenter operations, and I nternet and telecom infrastructure, and currently supports cybersecurity operations in the energy sector.